

Polish Digital Resilience Agenda 2040

a model of strategic preparedness
for the antinomies of digitalisation.

Scenario: Short blanket

strategic area: Energy

Scenario of the digital transformation of the Polish energy industry - diagnosis and road map until 2040

Strategic metaphor: short quilt

Resources to be allocated: capital, staff, time.

You cover one → you reveal the other

Decarbonisation

Cybersecurity

Speed

Cyber quality

Renewable energy


Grid stability

“Limited financial, human and time resources must be allocated with surgical precision - any omission exposes a critical weakness of the state.”

Three vectors of change forcing choices:

- **Decarbonization** — moving away from coal towards variable renewables
- **Deregulation** — passive consumers → active prosumers
- **Convergence** — blurring the boundaries of energy, transport, heating

The digital instability trap



The four pillars of the trap:

1. 1990s SCADA dominance – one-way, prosumer blind
2. **Fragmentation** - "islands of automation" without interoperability → losses of PLN 15-20 billion by 2040
3. **Staff deficit** — 200-300 graduates per year vs. 5,000-7,000 needed
4. **Cyber Vulnerability** - Level 2.1/5 against state and hybrid threats

The effects of inaction: what we lose without action

Risk of blackouts

Renewable energy sources exceeding 35% without digitalisation – system destabilisation

Losses due to IT fragmentation

PLN 15–20 billion by 2040

Lost market benefits

PLN 2–4 billion annually (lack of energy arbitrage)

Total cost of inaction

PLN 80–115 billion in direct losses by 2040

Loss of competitiveness

Inability to attract high-tech industry

Security threat

Critical infrastructure = target of a hybrid attack

Key argument: Passivity costs more than transformation and threatens a systemic catastrophe

Roadmap 2025–2040: three phases

Phase I (2025–2028): Emergency investments

- Fibre-optic connectivity to 100% of power stations
- IoT sensors at 50% of network nodes
- Modernisation of 30–40% of SCADA systems
- Establishment of the National Energy Transition Council (KRTE)
- 3 SOCs (Security Operations Centres) for OT
- Expenditure: approx. PLN 20 billion — absolute priority

Phase II (2029–2035): Acceleration

- Smart Grid in 80% of the network
- Integration of 1–2 million electric vehicles (V2G) = 4–10 GW of flexibility
- AI in 50% of network operations
- Investment: PLN 150–300 billion
- Targets: maturity 3.8/5, RES 45–55%, SAIDI < 150 min/year

Phase III (2036–2040): Optimisation and export

- 90% autonomous processes
- Post-quantum cryptography across all critical infrastructure
- Export of Smart Grid technology: €3–8 billion per year
- Targets: maturity 4.5/5, RES 60–70%, SAIDI < 100 min/year, zero curtailment

Cybersecurity: a new dimension of defense

Current status:

- OT readiness level: 2.1/5 (NIST) — basic, inadequate
- Reliance on foreign control systems: backdoor risk
- Shortage of IT/OT security specialists: a shortfall of 5,000–7,000

Threats:

- Organised criminal groups + state-sponsored actors
- Attacks on SCADA → physical paralysis of the distribution network
- Future quantum threats and post-quantum cryptography

Strategic response:

- Construction of 3 SOC centres for OT infrastructure
- Endogenous control algorithms
- Post-quantum cryptography as the Phase III standard

Two variants of the sector in 2040

	Transformation	Passivity
Digital maturity	4,5 / 5	~2.5/5
Renewables in the mix	60–70%	max. 35% (without blackouts)
SAIDI	< 100 min/year	Growing blackouts
Curtailment	Zero	Renewable energy disconnections
Technology export	EUR 3–8 billion/year	Lack
EVs on the grid	1–2 million (4–10 GW)	Marginal
Financial losses	Avoided	PLN 80–115 billion
Security	Digital sovereignty	Critical vulnerability

Recommendations



Immediate launch of Phase I
— window of opportunity: 2–3
years



Establishment of the National
Energy Transition Council —
central coordination of the
transition



A large-scale recruitment
programme — training 10
times as many IT/OT
specialists each year



An OT cybersecurity strategy
as part of a national defence
strategy



Treating digitalisation as an
investment, not a cost — a
budgetary priority

Conclusion: surgical precision of allocation

"This is not an energy transformation - it is a digital modernization of state security."

Old way of thinking

- Digitalisation = an IT project
- Renewable energy = environmental protection
- The cost of transformation

New way of thinking

- Digitalisation is a matter of national security
- Renewable energy without digitalisation – a threat to the grid
- The cost of inaction is higher

Postscript: one-page script

The scenario answers the brutal question: where do we really start from? And the answer is shocking. The Polish energy industry is not on the threshold of transformation - it is on the edge of the "digital instability trap". Digital Maturity Index: 2.1 out of 5. Distance to Denmark: 15 years. 70-80% of network operators manage critical infrastructure on SCADA systems from the 1990s. We educate 200-300 specialists a year when we need 5,000-7,000 of them immediately.

The "short quilt" metaphor in the title is precise and unforgiving: you have limited resources - money, people, time - and you have to choose what you cover. Every choice reveals something. You cover decarbonization - you expose security. You cover cybersecurity - you expose system integrity. If you invest in renewable energy without digitalisation - you risk blackouts with a renewable energy share above 35%.

The central mechanism is the digital instability trap — a self-reinforcing spiral: the more renewables (political necessity), the more the system needs intelligent management; the more it depends on digitalisation, the more susceptible it is to failures due to outdated infrastructure; the more susceptible - the more expensive each subsequent step. Without breaking this loop, renewable energy investment itself becomes a security threat.

The stakes are clear: the transformation costs PLN 400-900 billion. Passivity costs PLN 80-115 billion in losses - plus a potential systemic catastrophe. The window of opportunity closes in 2-3 years.